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
OPERATIONAL FIRES IN SUPPORT OF COUNTERDRUG CAMPAIGNS

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirement of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.



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ABSTRACT

A review of the current joint and service specific doctrine does not yield an accepted definition for operational fires for either a war or a military operation other than war, much less for counterdrug (CD) campaigns. The absence of an accepted definition notwithstanding, the question military professionals should ask is: Can operational fires be executed to support the commander in the conduct of a CD campaign? Even more precisely, how can operational fires be used to succeed in achieving strategic and operational CD objectives?

Operational fires have been executed that employed an indirect, non-lethal approach to attack the illicit drug industries' center of gravity. These operational fires, when viewed for the broad consequences they have on the enemy, serve to influence the courses of action at his disposal by "shaping" the environment in which he operates.

As an example, host nation support operations planned and conducted in U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility have facilitated the "funneling" of several illicit drug industry Kingpins onto a field that permitted direct engagement by other means--a close battle ensued that resulted in their neutralization.

Operational fires in support of CD campaigns must necessarily be viewed from a broad-minded vantage point--the way they "shape" the battlefield to "funnel" the enemy for a future decisive engagement. When evaluated from that perspective, clearly operational fires support the attainment of CD campaign aims.

Introduction. Operational fires is a concept not normally associated with military operations other than war (MOOTW), and therefore, not with counterdrug (CD) campaigns. The absence of an association notwithstanding, can operational fires be executed to support the theater Commander in Chief (CinC) in the conduct of his CD strategy? The simple answer is yes! However, there are many variables to consider to reach a thoughtful response in the affirmative. The path to the simple answer, as is known, is not always clearly defined, and in the case of operational fires, regardless of whether executed in a war or MOOTW situation, is a multifarious discussion.

This monograph will explore and bring to the fore some of the conceptual ideas and issues surrounding operational fires, and the applicability of operational fires in a CD campaign. As a starting point, a working definition for operational fires in support of MOOTW is established which can be used to frame the remainder of the essay. After defining operational fires, the CinC's guidance from higher authority for CD operations is reviewed. Then, the threat posed from illicit drugs is explored in order to facilitate identification of the enemy's center of gravity (COG). Next, U.S. Southern Command's (USSOUTHCOM) CD campaign plan is broadly outlined. Lastly, an example is cited as evidence to the applicability of operational fires in support of the CD campaign.

Defining Operational Fires.¹ A review of the current joint and service specific doctrine and associated publications does not

yield an accepted definition for operational fires for either a large scale, sustained combat operation (war) or a MOOTW. However, current doctrine does address CinC and Joint Force Commander (JFC) planning and does lay out a framework for designing joint operations and campaigns. These speak in broad terms of who, what, and how CinC/JFCs should focus their efforts when constructing a major operation or campaign plan. Regardless of the fact that current doctrine lacks specific guidance for planning or conducting operational fires, it does provide an accepted way of thinking about joint operations that can be developed and interpreted to establish a framework from which a working definition can be derived.

From the "big picture" of a joint operation or campaign, it is possible to construct an outline to define operational fires for MOOTW by answering the proverbial questions: who, what, when, where, how, and why? By answering: Who uses operational fires; what should operational fires target; when should operational fires be conducted; where should operational fires be employed; how should operational fires be executed; and why should operational fires be used, a working definition can be formulated.

Who uses operational fires?

...JFCs seek to attack enemy strategic centers of gravity, employing the appropriate forces and capabilities of the joint force. Such operations typically continue throughout the overall joint operation. As with all operations of the joint force, attacks of enemy strategic centers of gravity should be designed to support the JFCs' objectives.² (JCS PUB 3-0)

From the joint planning guidance it is clear that JFCs (the "who") would build operational fires into a major operation or campaign plan. But, JFCs would, in actuality, be building into their plan a bridge or supporting structure to cover the seam between operational and strategic objectives; a process that results in selecting targets that can be, in many cases, more strategic in nature than purely operational.

What should operational fires target?

The essence of operational art lies in being able to mass effects against the enemy's main source of power--his center of gravity, which he seeks to protect.³ (FM 100-5)

At the strategic-operational level of effort with which the CinC/JFC is concerned, it is clear from doctrine that the main effort should be directed toward the enemy's center of gravity (the "what"). All efforts necessarily are required to be directed to impact or influence the strategic-operational centers of gravity. Selecting the level at which specific targeting will be directed is usually coordinated with and influenced by higher authority. Nonetheless, the CinC/JFC must always strive to strike at the enemy's "hub of all power"⁴ if he wants to impact the courses of action available to the adversary.

When should operational fires be conducted?

In operations other than war, depth extends activities in time, space, resources, and purpose to affect the environment and conditions to be resolved. Seldom are short-term situations conclusive.⁵ (FM 100-5)

As demonstrated, the joint planning doctrine gives guidance that is particularly relevant for MOOTW. That is that MOOTW are seldom short-term. So, it can be deduced that operational fires

for a MOOTW will be a long-term, ongoing process (the "when")--an effort that can take place before the campaign begins and continues throughout the entire campaign.

Where should operational fires be employed?

...a JTF commander might plan and execute a campaign that would achieve the theater-strategic objectives of the CinC's theater campaign.⁶ (FM 100-5)

Deep operations are those directed against enemy forces and functions beyond the close battle.⁷ (FM 100-5)

The CinC is concerned with the integration of his CD campaign plan in the overall strategic plan as directed by the National Command Authority (NCA). As such, his efforts are centered on his area of responsibility (AOR) for which he has specific missions and tasks assigned. So, naturally the "where" question is answered by the CinC's defined AOR. The CinC could employ operational fires outside his AOR but he would require NCA approval and coordination with the other CinCs and agencies.

Additionally, operational fires should be employed in depth to expand the battlefield in space to enable friendly forces so that they can pick the place to fight the close battle.

How should operational fires be executed?

...JFCs attack enemy centers of gravity directly. Where direct attack means attacking into an opponents strength, JFCs should seek an indirect approach.⁸ (JCS PUB 3-0)

...commanders employ...fire support to enhance the expeditious attack of targets...and set the stage for future operations.⁹ (JCS PUB 3-0)

By extending the depth of the fight, commanders force the enemy to fight on their terms. Such in-depth operations degrade the enemy's freedom of action, reduce his flexibility and endurance, and upset his plans and coordination.¹⁰ (FM 100-5)

As described, if operational fires are to strike at the enemy's center of gravity, the CinC/JFC should determine how they will be executed to most effectively impact the enemy. In a broad sense, CinCs will use methods similar to those used in a war, but depending on the vulnerability of the enemy's center of gravity, operational fires may entail more indirect approaches than direct. This is especially true for CD campaign, where we would expect to find operational and strategic centers of gravity that require more "shaping" of the environment in order to enable a direct engagement. In either case, whether the center of gravity can be directly or indirectly engaged, joint planning doctrine provides general guidance as to how those methods should be executed.

Why should operational fires be used?

With NCA guidance...JFC strive to isolate enemies by denying them allies and sanctuary. The intent is to strip away as much enemy support or freedom of action as possible....¹¹(JCS PUB 3-0)

...Army forces use deep operations to set the conditions for decisive future operations.¹² (FM 100-5)

Lastly, the excerpts provide the CinC with a reason why operational fires should be used in a MOOTW. The idea of eliminating the enemy's external support and reducing his range of viable options can be instrumental in improving the possibility for an end-game with success. But, because the enemy can be so elusive in a MOOTW, the likelihood of directly engaging him in a decisive action is improbable. Therefore, what is required is a "funneling" of the enemy's actions over time, creating a constant pressure or force for him to deal with.

Fires that limit his ability to maneuver, such that other assets or means can be employed to acquire a "kill" on his center of gravity, are required.

A case in point was the final downfall of the infamous organized crime leader of Chicago in the 1920's, Al Capone. He ruled a gang that dominated the gambling, prostitution, and bootleg liquor activities of Chicago, grossing an estimated \$50 million annually at its peak. However, state and federal law enforcement authorities could never attack him directly on charges specific to his operation. But, in 1931 he was convicted of income tax evasion--a nonlethal, indirect attack stemming from his illegal activities.¹³

Thus, using the guidance provided by joint and service doctrine, a framework for defining operational fires for MOOTW can be formulated. A definition that, due to the inherent nature of MOOTW, is somewhat enigmatic. Regardless, for the purpose of this discussion on operational fires in support of CD campaigns, the following definition will be used:

Operational fires conducted in support of military operations other than war are those fires that are designed to be deep ranging in order to shape the area of operations (theater) such that the enemy's center of gravity is affected over time in a way that limits his preferred courses of action and causes him to seek less desirable alternatives to facilitate future decisive operations. They may be lethal or non-lethal and may take a direct or indirect approach to attack or influence his center of gravity.

Strategic Guidance. The next question to address then is: How does the CinC determine if operational fires can be used to support his campaign plan? To understand his ability to employ

operational fires one must first understand his mission, tasking(s), and guidance from higher authority. Only by having an idea of the guidance the CinC must follow to meet his objectives, and, when achieved, how they support national-strategic goals, will he possess the knowledge necessary to use operational fires. Thus, he determines the applicability of operational fires to his theater and the ensuing campaign.

Reviewing the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS) reveals the over-arching guidance for the CinC and provides the initial framework for his planning process. The involvement of the Department of Defense (DoD) in CD operations dates back to 1986 when President Ronald Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 221 which declared international drug trafficking to be a threat to U.S. national security.¹⁴ In 1989, this threat to national security resulted in specific tasking for DoD forces to combat drug trafficking. This threat is mentioned in every NSS and National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) from that date to the present.

Although shifts in the focus of the NDCS, as witnessed by changing rhetoric and resources, have occurred from one administration to another, DoD forces continue to be engaged in the "war on drugs" and tasked with specific responsibilities. In 1994, a major change in national policy and the resulting guidance to DoD occurred which declared a "controlled shift" in emphasis from transit zone interdiction to a source country

strategy.¹⁵ From a CinC perspective this shift in focus and resources toward source countries would be instrumental in planning a CD campaign--a shift that could potentially improve his ability to use operational fires. In short, the shift resulted in directing more energies to dismantling the drug trafficking organizations by denying them the infrastructure in which to operate.

Specific Secretary of Defense (SecDef) guidance directs that DoD focus its supporting efforts in Peru, Columbia, and Bolivia. Additionally, DoD is charged with enhancing its support of the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Kingpin strategy designed to destroy the cocaine cartels. Although DoD is limited from direct actions by U.S. Code, Title 10,¹⁶ an intensified effort to arrest and imprison international drug Kingpins can be facilitated by operational fires that "funnel" their options and thus enhance law enforcement avenues for direct attack on the center of gravity. Further, DoD is tasked with providing support to domestic law enforcement and host-nation detection and monitoring (D&M) efforts, emphasizing activities in cocaine source countries.¹⁷

With those missions defined, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) advised the SecDef as to the recommended regional tasks and the subsequent assignment of task execution to be apportioned to four combatant commanders.¹⁸ Each commander is to accomplish the mission and tasks within his assigned geographic area of responsibility.¹⁹

These four primary counterdrug commanders are tasked with numerous specific responsibilities, but one that overlies these tasks is to establish long-range planning to develop CD campaign strategies. This is key to the CinC's responsibilities. Developing CD strategies is the task that allows him the opportunity, in coordination with and support of federal agencies, to use operational fires to further national-strategic and operational objectives.

The Threat. To understand how the CinC might exploit the adversary through the use operational fires, he must first be fully aware of the threat and how operational fires can be employed to attack its COG. Therefore, the scope of the threat must be defined in order for the CinC to develop a campaign plan. Today as we listen to reports on the six o'clock news, there is a rise in drug use by the Nation's youth. The impact of illicit drugs is widespread and does not affect only the user or abuser,²⁰ but reaches the very core of America's economic well being and cultural existence.

Illicit drug use and its consequences is one of the major problems facing the U.S. today. The use of illicit drugs is weakening the fiscal, moral and physical health of the public sector.²¹ Recent reports indicate the U.S. is the largest consumer of illegal narcotics. Indeed, data indicates the American consumer of illicit drugs consumes 50% of the worldwide production while only accounting for five percent of the world's population.²² Estimates range from \$50 billion²³ to \$110 billion²⁴

spent yearly on illicit drugs by the American public. The White House reports resources totalling roughly \$25 billion are spent from Federal, State and local governments yearly on drug control efforts.²⁵

Most disturbing in the latest figures is the reported increase in drug use by the Nation's youth and a continuation of the hardcore²⁶ drug user population. Additionally, use of cocaine, crack, heroin and LSD is approaching all time high (no pun intended) levels reached in the '70's.²⁷

Reports indicate the hardcore drug user group is responsible for the majority of drug related criminal activity. Drug use and crime overlap and interact in a multiplicity of ways. Moreover, the connection between drug use and predatory crime, along with the possible corruption of the young, constitutes the major source of public fear and apprehension regarding drug use.²⁸

Further, drug use is straining the Nation's health care system. The rate of drug-related emergency room episodes per 100,000 of the total U.S. population increased 22%, from 167 in 1990 to 204 in 1993. Nearly one-half of all episodes involved the use of two or more drugs. More than one-third of all AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) cases were associated with the reckless, self-destructive behavior of drug users.²⁹

The threat from illicit drugs is huge and easily recognized in a post-mortem sense. The perplexing question for the CinC is "what is the center of gravity of the threat?" How can I strike it directly and if it is too protected or layered how do I get at

it by "shaping" the environment to "funnel" it directly or indirectly, putting it at risk by other means? Indeed, how can I use operational fires to influence my AOR such that the enemy will be made vulnerable to other means of attack? The answer begins with the identification of the enemy's center of gravity--not an easy process. But first, one must recognize the desired end state--not just the military end state, but, especially true for MOOTW, the political end state. A discussion could go on for numerous pages, but, for the purpose of this essay, the desired political end state for the U.S. is: Reduce the tremendous economic and human costs posed by illicit drug use.³⁰

U.S. strategy, as already mentioned, is now focused on source countries that are involved in the production and processing of cocaine. With sufficient intelligence and knowledge the threat's strengths and weaknesses can be identified and subsequently targeted by commanders.³¹ Focusing on USSOUTHCOM's AOR, the area of concern where the majority of coca plants are grown is a region known as the "Andean Ridge." The "Ridge" contains the major source countries producing cocaine: Peru, Columbia, and Bolivia. Peru and Bolivia are the leading producers of the coca leaf supply, while Columbia is the primary refining site that produces the white powder--cocaine.³²

The production, transportation, and marketing of illegal drugs are supported by systems similar in character but quite often uniquely different for reasons of geography, processing requirements, and the mere weight and volume of the product.

Also, each system contains a subset of components that encompasses the drug trafficking system. These are: growers and producers, smugglers, intelligence system, couriers, distributors, dealers, financiers, kingpins, money launderers, narcoterrorists, insurgents, and drug cartels.

There are clearly identifiable strategic and operational centers of gravity within the illicit drug producing system. At the strategic level, two components are key: the demand for illegal drugs and the huge profits that can be accrued from the drug industry. Without a customer and without the currency to produce the crops, chemicals, transportation, sanctuary, popular support, public officials, and even governments, the industry would collapse.³³ At the operational level, the center of gravity is the organizations themselves--the drug cartels, and at the head of each, the Kingpin.³⁴ By DoD definition, the Kingpin is that individual whose role in all aspects of that organization's drug trafficking is such that the neutralization of the Kingpin and his leadership would result in the collapse and dismantling of the organization's infrastructure.³⁵ The result would be a significant decrease in the flow of drugs to the U.S.

U.S. Southern Command's Counterdrug Campaign Plan. Now, it must be asked: Can the CinC strike at the strategic and operational centers of gravity? And, more precisely, can operational fires be employed by the CinC to directly or indirectly attack the drug industries' center of gravity? If so, how does the CinC apply

fires to achieve strategic and operational objectives?

USSOUTHCOM's CD campaign plan includes operations that are conducted via coordinated actions, and that are to be executed and sustained until all of the three phases are completed and the desired end state achieved.³⁶ Phase One of the plan includes administrative actions and provides the framework for follow-on operations. Much of this phase is centered on the process of a multi-year campaign that directs operations against the threat and describes what leadership has to do to achieve the objectives. Phase One objectives are, for the most part, subjective in nature and described in terms of: build, develop, enhance, initiate, identify, and establish.³⁷

Phase Two of the campaign begins when host nations have developed the capabilities to conduct operations against illicit drug production and trafficking organizations. In Phase One a campaign is initiated to reduce the flow of drugs into the U.S. by attaining the objectives. Phase Two encompasses the more forceful operations designed to "destroy or damage beyond repair a drug organization's physical infrastructure to cultivate, process and transport illicit drugs."³⁸ Subsequent to the decisive operations conducted for physical destruction are those designed to achieve the capture, arrest, extradition and/or imprisonment of the key leaders of the drug trafficking organizations.³⁹

Phase Three of the campaign is designed to consolidate the successes from previous phases. It is a long-term effort that

aims to prevent the reconstitution of the drug trafficking organizations.

As outlined, the campaign, though divided into phases, is designed as a synergistic plan. Therefore, the phases are concurrent, not sequential. When successes are attained, the flexibility allowed through concurrent phasing can be maximized to step up the tempo and keep the threat under constant pressure.⁴⁰ In the same manner, operational fires are integrated to "set the stage" for the phases and are likely to be executed throughout the campaign.

Host Nation Support as Operational Fires. Return now to the question of how the CinC can employ operational fires to attack the enemy's center of gravity. How can operational fires be used to limit the enemy's courses of action to "funnel" him onto a battlefield so that he can be defeated?

USSOUTHCOM's host nation support operations can be and have been one example of operational fires in support of the CD campaign--fires that have been conducted in support of a military operation other than war--the "war" on drugs. These operational fires, designed to facilitate the elimination and/or prevention of the production and transshipment of illegal drugs into the U.S. by shaping the CinC's AOR, are indirect, non-lethal, and strike at the enemy's center of gravity by limiting his courses of action and maintaining a constant pressure on his operation.

As already mentioned, many of the United States' national resources have been focused on the cocaine producing countries of

Peru, Columbia and Bolivia. Likewise, USSOUTHCOM's efforts, in concert with numerous Federal agencies, have been devoted to enhancing these source countries' capabilities to establish positive control over sovereign territory.⁴¹ Clearly, once the host nation has the resources and wherewithal to control its own borders, that nation will indirectly support USSOUTHCOM's CD campaign and serve as a "funnel" to limit the enemy's actions--assuming they have national will.

Supporting actions to improve host nation political will is part and parcel to USSOUTHCOM's CD strategy. Backing host nation efforts to strengthen democratic institutions' political wills are key components used to shape the theater and thus restrict the enemy's actions.⁴² It is well known that drug traffickers execute operations and tactics aimed at disrupting democratic rule. Traffickers have used bribery, murder, assassination, and intimidation to undermine political institutions and governmental authority.⁴³ As James W. Shaver, former Assistant Commissioner for International Affairs, U.S. Customs Service, stated, "narcotrafficking is a problem which destabilizes the politics, economic and social fabric of a country." This use of insurgent groups as hired killers to shape the area of operations to their advantage is well documented. Thus, a countering of that environment to enhance future CD operations through indirect methods is an application of operational fires.

The end-game, the ability of U.S. forces to shape the battlefield permitting indirect engagement of the enemy in

decisive actions through other means, is also evidenced in recent history. A case in point is the operational fires designed to bolster political will and drug enforcement capabilities of Columbia and Peru. While limited by Title 10 and other statutes, U.S. forces were able to shape the theater in 1993 by facilitating the arrest of Demitrio Chavez Penaherra, one of the largest Peruvian drug traffickers. Penaherra was arrested in Columbia by indigenous forces and expelled to Peru, where he was convicted for narcotrafficking and treason. Subsequently, he was sentenced to a 30 year prison term. A similar case could be made for the death of Pablo Escobar and the marked demise of the once-dominant Medellin Cartel.⁴⁴ Arguably, the end-game achieved in the latter case, while not directly executed by U.S. forces using lethal means, was in fact supported by the fires that provided the national will to pursue the Kingpin and thereby enabled a direct strike on the threat's COG.

Other cases could be made for host nation support as operational fires. In these instances, enhancing the nation's military professionalism and their capability to combat and defeat drug-related insurgent/terrorist groups provided an indirect approach to prepare the field for future operations.⁴⁵ As recently as April 1995, the fires executed to shape the CinC's AOR have resulted in Peru's government renewing its political will by emphasizing its military's number one mission as that of fighting narcotrafficking.⁴⁶

Similarly, operational fires can be employed to indirectly

attack the strategic COG, the huge profits accrued from the drug industry, through the enhancement of source country relations. International cooperation is critical to peel back the multiple layers involved in money laundering, and should be targeted towards international banking and non-banking institutions, and to assist foreign nations involved in regional money laundering investigations.⁴⁷ These efforts necessarily must be designed to be fully participative and cooperative with host nations who target criminal organizations and can only happen when the political will is present.⁴⁸ Again, this is an area where host nation operational fires will facilitate future operations designed to engage the COG. USSOUTHCOM has, while limited in the direct engagement of the enemy, shaped the environment to facilitate the end-game, in conjunction with other agencies.

Lastly, USSOUTHCOM's CD campaign has supported the enhancement of source countries' capabilities to interdict drug traffickers. USSOUTHCOM has assisted these nations through security assistance material including: transport aircraft, helicopters, river patrol boats, observation aircraft, and numerous other interdiction assets. These programs, considering their overall ability to shape the battlefield, are operational fires which have improved the capabilities of the host nation and indirectly permitted an attack on the enemy's COG.⁴⁹

Conclusion. Operational fires support the CinC in the conduct of his CD campaign. However, operational fires conducted in support of MOOTW must be viewed conceptually from a macro vantage point--

broadly for their application and in the way they can shape the environment for future operations. Remembering that these fires, not unlike those conducted in a war, are to be directed to affect the enemy's center of gravity, they usually take a circuitous approach. Because direct engagement of the enemy is often impossible, a "funneling" of the enemy onto a battlefield where other means can be employed to produce an end-game with success is required. Therefore, the CinC has to evaluate the employment of operational fires for their affect on the extended battlefield, a battlefield necessarily lengthened by time due to the inherent nature of the threat. He needs to ensure operational fires executed are integrated and coordinated with other federal agencies and host nations to facilitate the desired operational and strategic end.

Notes

1. Much of the framework used to develop a definition for operational fires came from the work of Lieutenant Colonel Jay W. Hood, U.S. Army, "Operational Fires and the Joint Force Commander." His structure for thinking about operational fires was expanded to more directly address Military Operations Other than War.
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. (Washington: 1995), IV-8.
3. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations. (Washington: 1993), 6-7.
4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 595.
5. FM 100-5, 2-8.
6. Ibid., 6-2.
7. Ibid., 6-14.
8. JCS PUB 3-0, III-21.
9. JCS PUB 3-0, III-33.
10. FM-100-5, 2-7.
11. JCS PUB 3-0, IV-2.
12. FM 100-5, 6-14.
13. Marcia Guthrie, "Alphonse Capone," Collier's Encyclopedia, 1995 ed., Vol. 5 of 24, 380.
14. Arnaldo Claudio and Stephan K. Stewman, "OPLAN Narco," Military Review, Vol. LXXII, No. 12, (December: 1992), 64.
15. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations. (Washington: 1994), I-3.
16. Title 10 is the "Armed Forces" section of the U.S. Code. Chapter 18, "Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies," gives basic guidance for the interaction of military, Reserve component, and civilian law enforcement agencies. Restrictions on direct participation in law enforcement activities, on use of information collected during military

operations, use of military equipment and facilities, and guidelines on reimbursement are some of the topics covered. Title 10 prohibits the military from directly participating in arrests, searches, seizures or other similar activity unless authorized by law.

17. JCS PUB 3-07.4, I-11.

18. The four CD commanders assigned to accomplish CD missions within their respective AOR are: Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, and Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command.

19. JCS PUB 3-07.4, 1-19.

20. The expression "drug abuser" has been variously defined but is generally used to refer to the person who has excessive drug use, persons who use drugs and exhibit unjustified problems and persons who take drugs solely for its stimulant effects and not the intended therapeutic effects.

21. The White House, National Drug Control Strategy: Progress in the War on Drugs 1989-1992 (Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1993), 1.

22. "Meet the Press," NBC newshow broadcast April 28, 1996, in which the recently appointed National Drug Control Czar, General McCaffery, U.S. Army (Ret.) was interviewed by the host Tim Russert.

23. The White House, National Drug Control Strategy 1995: Strengthening Communities' Response to Drugs and Crime (Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1995), 145.

24. Jonathan Scott Davis, "U.S. National Drug Control Strategy and The Andean Initiative: Roots of Failure," Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA: 1994, 31.

25. The White House, National Drug Control Strategy 1995, 11.

26. Chronic hardcore drug users are addicted drug users who consume illicit drugs on a weekly basis and exhibit behavioral problems stemming from their drug use.

27. Matthew Robinson, "Another Shot in War on Drugs." Investor's Business Daily, Vol. 12, No. 106, 11 September 1995, A1-A2.

28. Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, The Search for Rational Drug Control (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 137.

29. Ibid., 36.
30. The White House, National Drug Control Strategy 1995. (Washington: 1995), 9.
31. JCS PUB 3-07.4, II-14.
32. Ibid., II-2.
33. Ibid., II-14.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., II-8.
36. David G. Bradford, "Planning for Victory in the War on Drugs," Military Review, Vol. 74, No. 10, (October: 1994), 18.
37. Ibid., 19.
38. Ibid., 20.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. JCS PUB 3-07.4, VI-2.
42. Ibid., VI-3.
43. Bradford, 15-16.
44. Brian E. Sheridan, "Supporting the Counterdrug Effort," Military Review, Issue 4, (1994), 41-42.
45. JCS PUB 3-07.4, VI-3.
46. Brian E. Sheridan, "Statement," U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs, Western Hemisphere Drug Control Strategy, Hearings. (Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1995), 23.
47. Davis, 49.
48. Donald J. Mabry, ed., The Latin American Narcotic Trade and U.S. National Security. (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1989), 120.
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